The use of Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) in Cryptography is a recent breakthrough that has caught the interest of both theoreticians and practitioners. A major step towards understanding and securely using PUFs has been done in [CRYPTO 2011] where Brzuska, Fischlin, Schröder and Katzenbeisser augmented the Universal Composition (UC) Framework of Canetti [FOCS 2001] by considering Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). Their model considers trusted PUFs only (i.e., adversaries are assumed to be unable to produce fake/malicious PUFs). Moreover they assumed that the simulator can observe queries made by an adversary to a PUF (i.e., an adversary can access a PUF only in a prescribed detectable way). Since the study of PUFs to achieve cryptographic tasks is still in its infancy, assuming such limitations on the capabilities of the adversaries in misbehaving with PUFs might not correspond to real-world scenarios.
Introduction
The impossibility of secure computation in the universal composability framework has been
The model of Brzuska et al. [BFSK11] . In the model of Brzuska et al. the Universal Composition (UC) Framework of Canetti is augmented by including PUFs modeled with only basic properties. Even if there exist technologies for the construction of PUFs that enjoy other advanced properties, the choice of Brzuska et al. is to consider only the basic properties obtained by all current realizations of PUFs. Such properties are unpredictability and uncloneability. The first property informally means that the only way to know the output of a PUF on input a given value, consists in querying it. The second property is that PUFs are unique in their input/output behavior, therefore without possession of a given PUF, it is not possible to predict its output to a query, even in case outputs of other queries have been previously obtained. Since the PUF model of Brzuska et al. is integrated in the UC framework, PUFs are defined through an ideal functionality.
Our Contribution
Relaxing the model of Brzuska et al. The model of Brzuska et al. considers trusted PUFs only (i.e., adversaries are assumed to be unable to produce fake/malicious PUFs). Moreover it is assumed that the simulator can observe queries made by an adversary to a trusted PUF (i.e., an adversary can access a honest PUF only through a detectable and understandable process).
In this work we continue this research direction by focusing on relaxing the two above restrictions. Indeed given that the study of PUFs is still in its infancy, it is risky to rely on assumptions on the capabilities of the adversaries in generating and accessing PUFs adversarially. Our goal consists in presenting security models that are resilient to the above plausible real-world attacks (viz., adversaries producing malicious PUFs, or adversaries making "hidden" queries to PUFs so that the simulator can not observe these queries).
We present two relaxations of the model of Brzuska et al. and in both cases we give positive answers to the question of achieving universally composable secure computation with PUFs. The importance of our contribution lies precisely in improving the goal of Brzuska et al. that chose to give a "very minimalistic model" (see discussion in the second page of [BFSK11]). Indeed their formulation has two strong requirements that could not be achieved by real-world PUFs, namely: 1) impossibility of generating malicious PUFs; 2) impossibility of finding alternative procedures (unknown to the others) to query a honest PUF. Not only we present two interesting relaxed formulations, but we also show that in both cases UC secure computation is possible. More details follow below.
Malicious PUF generation. We augment the UC framework with untrusted (malicious) PUFs, so that an adversary is assumed to be able to produce fake PUFs (e.g., stateful, programmed with malicious code). The natural question is whether UC security can be achieved in such a much more hostile setting. We give a positive answer by relying on the (realistic) assumption that standard computational assumptions still hold in presence of PUFs.
Hardness assumptions with PUFs. Notice that as correctly observed in [BFSK11], since PUFs are not PPT machines, it is not clear if standard complexity-theoretic assumptions still hold in presence of PUFs. We agree with this observation. However the critical point is that even though there can exist a PUF that helps to break in polynomial time a standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, it is still unlikely that a PPT adversary can find such a PUF. Indeed a PPT machine can only generate a polynomial number of PUFs, therefore obtaining the one that allows to break complexity assumptions is an event that happens with negligible probability and thus it does not effect the concrete security of the protocols.
In light of the above discussion, only one of the following two cases is possible. 1) Standard complexity-theoretic assumptions still hold in presence of PPT adversaries that generate PUFs; in this case our constructions are secure. 2) There exists a PPT adversary that can generate a PUF that breaks standard assumptions; in this case our constructions are not secure, but the whole foundations of complexity-theoretic cryptography would fall down (which is quite unlikely to happen) with respect to real-world adversaries.
Malicious access to PUFs. We augment the UC framework with trusted (honest) PUFs following the spirit of [BFSK11], but we relax the requirement that queries made by an adversary can be observed by a simulator. The reason is that we do not want to make the assumption that an adver-sary has only black-box access to the PUF 2 . It is possible that a smart real-world adversary could be able to stimulate the PUF with a physical process that is different from the one prescribed by the PUF designer. In this case, it is not clear to someone observing the system what the corresponding query/response pair is. The above point is reinforced by drawing an analogy with the Knowledge of Exponent assumption (KEA) [Dam91, BP04] . Let g be a generator of an "appropriate" group (for details, see [BP04] ), and consider an adversary A that gets as input (g, g a ), and outputs a pair (C, Y ). The adversary wins if C a = Y . Roughly, the knowledge of exponent assumption states that the only way for the adversary to win is to choose c, and output (g c , g ac ). Or in other words, to win, the adversary must know the exponent c. This is formalized by saying that for every adversary, there exists an extractor that can output c. We feel that in the case of PUFs, assuming that the simulator can observe the PUF queries of the adversary is similar in spirit to the KEA (which is a controversial, non-standard and non-falsifiable assumption). Note that the main assumption in KEA is that there is only one way for the adversary to output a winning tuple, and this is debatable. Also, in the case of PUFs, as we have discussed in the previous paragraphs, we can not rule out existence of malicious procedures for accessing PUFs. Now, one can object that the above restriction to the simulator is not relevant since we can always have a non-black-box simulator based on the code of the adversary, that by definition knows the querying mechanisms of the adversary. However, in presence of such non-black-box simulators, it should still be hard for the simulator to understand a query, when a protocol is executed in the universal composability framework. Indeed the order of quantifiers in the UC definition is ∀A∃S, and therefore if an adversary is able to query a PUF in some special way, there should exist a simulator that can understand the query and the answer. However this objection fails when one would like to follow the spirit of UC security. Indeed in the UC framework there is an environment Z that can not be rewound by the simulator. Technically speaking, in the UC definition, we have the following quantifiers: ∀A∃S∀Z. It is therefore possible that an adversary does not know how to query a PUF in some alternative way, and therefore the simulator does not know it either 3 . However the environment is in possession of this knowledge, and can instruct the adversary to query the PUF in some special way getting back the result. Notice that the UC definition allows the environment to use the adversary as a proxy. Therefore following this modeling, when the adversary holds a PUF the environment is allowed to ask the adversary to query the PUF in a different way, sending some data X. The adversary performs this procedure and sends back to the environment some data Y . Now the environment knows that X correspond to a query x, and the obtained data Y corresponds to an output y. However both the adversary and the simulator are unaware of these mappings, and therefore they have no idea about which query has been asked and which answer has been obtained 4 .
Clearly because of this lack of information, the adversary could not continue a protocol that needs the input/output of the PUF (i.e., x/y in the above example) without knowing such values. However this is not an issue for the adversary in the UC framework. Indeed it can still continue the protocol acting as a proxy with the environment that therefore would be the actual adversary using 2 Contrast this scenario with the case of tamper-proof hardware tokens. In the case of these tokens, due to the "tramper-proof" assumption, an adversary can only observe the input/output behavior of the token, and thus it is justified for the simulator to observe an adversary's queries. However, as we argue next, the case of PUFs is different.
3 Moreover we can not assume that a simulator has hardwired in all possible physical processes that can be used to query a PUF since there is no evidence that the number of such procedures is polynomially bounded. 4 We stress that this behavior does not violate unpredictability since the PUF has been actually queried with input x, but since a different procedure has been used, the query is not detected by the simulator. a PUF but hiding his queries. The PUF is however still accessible by the adversary, and therefore still accessible by the simulator too (that can still query it as already allowed in the definition of [BFSK11]).
Obviously if the environment instructs the adversary to physically access the PUF in some special way, one should also take into account the fact that the environment might ask the adversary to destroy the PUF 5 . Therefore one might have an adversary that is able to access the PUF in some undetectable way (i.e., the simulator does not catch queries asked by the adversary and the corresponding answers given by the PUF), and then immediately destroys the PUF (i.e., later on the simulator will no be able to query the PUF again). In this case it seems that both advantages of the simulator with respect to malicious players considered in the definition of [BFSK11] disappear and therefore UC security can not be achieved. Indeed, since the simulator (because of the oblivious access to a PUF) can not observe the queries asked by the adversary and (because of the capability of destroying a PUF after its use) can not query a PUF after adversary's queries, it is not clear how one can get any reasonable advantage to achieve UC security, which requires straight-line simulation (i.e., straight-line extraction of the input of the adversary and straight-line equivocality of the input played on behalf of the honest party).
Very surprisingly we show that in this model unconditional UC secure computation is possible! The construction given in [BFSK11] clearly fails in such a relaxed model, but we use it as a building block along with other techniques to design our construction therefore obtaining security against stronger adversary and thus improving their result.
Definitions
Notation. We denote by n the security parameter and by PPT the property of an algorithm of running in probabilistic polynomial-time.
We denote by (v A , v B ) ← A(a), B(b) (x) the random process obtained by having A and B interacting on common input x and on (private) auxiliary inputs a and b to A and B, respectively (if any), and with independent random coin tosses for A and B, and by (v A , v B ) the local outputs of parties A and B, respectively, after the completion of their interaction. When the common input x is the security parameter, we omit it. We use v $ ← Alg() when the algorithm Alg() is randomized. We denote by view A (A(a), B(b))(x) the view of A of the interaction with player B, i.e., its values is the transcript (γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ t ; r), where the γ i 's are all the messages exchanged and r is A's coin tosses. Finally, let P 1 and P 2 be two parties running a protocol that uses protocol (A,B) as sub-protocol. When we say that party "P 1 runs A(·), B(·) (·) with P 2 " we always mean that P 1 executes the procedure of party A and P 2 executes the procedure of party B.
For two random variables X and Y with supports in {0, 1} n , the statistical difference between X and Y , denoted by SD(X, Y ), is defined as,
Physically Uncloneable Functions
In this section we follow the definitions given in [BFSK11]. A Physically Uncloneable Function (PUF) is a noisy physical source of randomness. The randomness property comes from an uncon-trollable manufacturing process. A PUF is evaluated with a physical stimulus, called the challenge, and its physical output, called the response, is measured. Because the processes involved are physical, the function implemented by a PUF can not necessarily be modeled as a mathematical function, neither can be considered computable in PPT. Moreover, the output of a PUF is noisy, namely, querying a PUF twice with the same challenge, could yield to different outputs. The mathematical formalization of a PUF due to [BFSK11] is the following.
A PUF-family P is a pair of (not necessarily efficient) algorithms Sample and Eval. Algorithm Sample abstracts the PUF fabrication process and works as follows. Given the security parameter in input, it outputs a PUF-index id from the PUF-family satisfying the security property (that we define soon) according to the security parameter. Algorithm Eval abstracts the PUF-evaluation process. On input a challenge q, it evaluates the PUF on q and outputs the response a. Without loss of generality, we assume that the challenge space of a PUF is a full set of strings of a certain length.
Definition 1 (Physically Uncloneable Functions). Let rg denote the size of the range of a PUFfamily and d noise denote a bound of the PUF's noise. P = (Sample, Eval) is a family of (rg, d noise )-PUF if it satisfies the following properties.
Index Sampling. Let I n be an index set. On input the security parameter n, the sampling algorithm Sample outputs an index id ∈ I n following a not necessarily efficient procedure. Each id ∈ I n corresponds to a set of distributions
. D id is not necessarily an efficiently samplable distribution. Evaluation. On input the tuple (1 n , id, q), where q ∈ {0, 1} n , the evaluation algorithm Eval outputs a response a ∈ {0, 1} rg(n) according to distribution D id (q). It is not required that Eval is a PPT algorithm. Bounded Noise. For all indexes id ∈ I n , for all challenges q ∈ {0, 1} n , when running Eval(1 n , id, q) twice, the Hamming distance of any two responses a 1 , a 2 is smaller than d noise (n).
In the following we use PUF id (q) to denote D id . When not misleading, we omit id from PUF id , using only the notation PUF.
Security of PUFs. We assume that PUFs enjoy the properties of uncloneability and unpredictability. Unpredictability is modeled via an entropy condition on the PUF distribution. Namely, given that a PUF has been measured on a polynomial number of challenges, the response of the PUF evaluated on a new challenge has still a significant amount of entropy. Furthermore, we assume that PUFs are tamper-evident. In the following we recall the concept of average min-entropy, and the formal definition of PUF-unpredictability.
Definition 2 (Average min-entropy). The average min-entropy of the measurement PUF(q) conditioned on the measurements of challenges Q = (q 1 , . . . , q ) is defined bỹ
where the probability is taken over the choice of id from I n and the choice of possible PUF responses on challenge q. The term PUF(Q) denotes a sequence of random variables PUF(q 1 ), . . . , PUF(q ) each corresponding to an evaluation of the PUF on challenge q k .
Definition 3 (Unpredictability). A (rg, d noise )-PUF family p = (Sample, Eval) for security parameter n is (d min (n), m(n))-unpredictable if for any q ∈ {0, 1} n and challenge list Q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ), one has that, if for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n the Hamming distance satisfies dis ham (q,
Fuzzy Extractors. The output of a PUF is noisy, that is, feeding it with the same challenge twice may yield distinct, but still close, responses. Fuzzy extractors of Dodis et al. [DORS08] are applied to the outputs of the PUF to convert such noisy, high-entropy measurements into reproducible randomness.
Let U denote the uniform distribution on -bit strings. Let M be a metric space with the distance function dis: M × M → R + .
Definition 4 (Fuzzy Extractors). Let dis be a distance function for metric space M. A (m, , t, )-fuzzy extractor is a pair of efficient randomized algorithms (FuzGen, FuzRep). The algorithm FuzGen on input w ∈ M, outputs a pair (p, st), where st ∈ {0, 1} is a secret string and p ∈ {0, 1} * is a helper data string. The algorithm FuzRep, on input an element w ∈ M and a helper data string p ∈ {0, 1} * outputs a string st. A fuzzy extractor satisfies the following properties.
Correctness. For all w, w ∈ M, if dis(w, w) ≤ t and (st, p)
Security. For any distribution W on the metric space M, that has min-entropy m, the first component of the random variable (st, p), defined by drawing w according to W and then applying FuzGen, is distributed almost uniformly, even given p, i.e., SD((st, p),
, a matching fuzzy extractor has the following parameters: (n) = n, t(n) = d noise (n), and is a negligible function in n. The metric space M is the range {0, 1} rg with Hamming distance dis ham . We call such PUF family and fuzzy extractor as having matching parameters, and the following properties are guaranteed.
Well-Spread Domain. For all polynomial p(n) and all set of challenges q 1 , . . . , q p(n) , the probability that a randomly chosen challenge is within distance smaller than d min with any q k is negligible.
Extraction Independence. For all challenges q 1 , . . . , q p(n) , and for a challenge q such that dis(q, q k ) > d min for 1 ≤ k ≤ p(n), it holds that the PUF evaluation on q and subsequent application of FuzGen yields an almost uniform value st even if p is observed.
Response consistency. Let a, a be the responses of PUF when queried twice with the same challenge q, then for (st, p)
UC Security with Malicious PUFs
In Section 1 we have motivated the need of different formulation of UC security with PUFs that allows the adversary to generate malicious PUFs. In this section we first show how to model malicious PUFs in the UC framework, and then we show that as long as standard computational assumptions still hold when PPT adversary can generate (even malicious) PUFs, there exist protocols for UC realizing any functionality with (malicious) PUFs.
Modeling Malicious PUFs
We allow our adversaries to send malicious PUFs to honest parties. As discussed before, the motivation for malicious PUFs is that the adversary may have some control over the manufacturing process and may be able to produce errors in the process that break the PUF's security properties. Thus, we would like the parties to rely on only the PUFs that they themselves manufacture, and not on the ones they receive. We think of a malicious-PUF family as a PUF-family that does not guarantee the security property of Definition 3. Of course, we also want the honest parties to be able to obtain and send honestly generated PUFs. Thus our ideal functionality for PUFs, F PUF (Figure 1 ) is parameterized by two PUF families: the normal (or honest) family (Sample normal , Eval normal ) and the possibly malicious family (Sample mal , Eval mal ). When a party P i wants to initialize a PUF, it specifies a mode ∈ { normal, mal } to F PUF , and the ideal functionality uses the corresponding family for initializing the PUF. For each initialized PUF, the ideal functionality F PUF also stores a tag representing the family (i.e., mal or normal) from which it was initialized. Thus, when the PUF needs to be evaluated, F PUF runs the evaluation algorithm corresponding to the tag. The handover procedure remains the same as in the original formulation of Brzuska et al. [BFSK11] . Each PUF has a status flag which determines whether it is in transit or not. We allow the PUF to be queried by the adversary while it is in transit. Thus, when a party P i hands over a PUF to party P j , that PUF's flag is changed from notrans to trans, and the adversary is allowed to send evaluation queries to this PUF. When the adversary is done with querying the PUF, it sends a ready PUF message to the ideal functionality, which hands over the PUF to P j and changes the PUFs transit flag back to notrans. The party P j may now query the PUF. The ideal functionality now waits for a received PUF message from the adversary, at which point it sends a received PUF message to P i informing it that the handover is complete. The ideal functionality is described formally in 
Constructions for UC Security in the Malicious PUFs model
In this section we start presenting a construction that UC-realizes the F com functionality. We then show how to obtain UC security for any functionality.
Recall that the major difficulty when using (honest) PUFs (in contrast to tamper-proof tokens) is that PUFs are not programmable. This means that the simulator must honestly answer all queries made by the adversary by forwarding them to the actual PUF. Thus, the simulator can only exploit the power of observing the queries made by the adversary to the PUF received from the honest party, and of running the PUF when it is still possessed by the adversary. In the honest PUF model, the simulator is guaranteed that any PUF sent by the adversary is honest. This means that the answers received from such a PUF are unpredictable for the adversary as well, and more importantly, the adversary has no control of the behaviour of the PUF. This fact is of great help in designing protocols with honest PUFs.
In the malicious PUFs model instead, the behaviour of a PUF sent by an adversary is entirely in the adversary's control. This means that the malicious PUF can answer (or even abort) adaptively on the query according to some pre-shared strategy with the malicious creator. Also, even though the malicious PUF can now be programmable, the honest PUF is still unpredictable. In particular, the simulator is still constrained to send an honest PUF which outputs are therefore out of the control of the simulator. F PUF is parameterized by PUF families P 1 = (Sample normal , Eval normal ) with parameters (rg, d noise , d min , m), and P 2 = (Sample mal , Eval mal ), and receives as initial input a security parameter 1 n and runs with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and adversary S.
• When a party P i writes (init PUF , sid, mode, P i ) on the input tape of F PUF , where mode ∈ { normal, mal }, then F PUF checks whether L already contains a tuple (sid, * , * , * , * , * ):
-If this is the case, then turn into the waiting state.
-Else, draw id ← Sample mode (1 n ) from the PUF-family. Put (sid, id, mode, P i , notrans) in L and write (initialized PUF , sid) on the communication tape of P i .
• When party P i writes (eval PUF , sid, P i , q) on F PUF 's input tape, check if there exists a tuple (sid, id, mode, P i , notrans) in L.
-If not, then turn into waiting state.
-Else, run a ← Eval mode (1 n , id, q). Write (response PUF , sid, q, a) on P i 's communication input tape.
• When a party P i sends (handover PUF , sid, P i , P j ) to F PUF , check if there exists a tuple (sid, * , * , P i , notrans) in L.
-Else, modify the tuple (sid, id, mode, P i , notrans) to the updated tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )). Write (invoke PUF , sid, P i , P j ) on S's communication input tape.
• When the adversary sends (eval PUF , sid, S, q) to F PUF , check if L contains a tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans( * )).
-Else, run a ← Eval mode (1 n , id, q) and return (response PUF , sid, q, a) to S.
• When S sends (ready PUF , sid, S) to F PUF , check if L contains the tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )).
-If not found, turn into the waiting state.
-Else, change the tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )) to (sid, id, mode, P j , notrans) and write (handover PUF , sid, P i ) on P j 's communication input tape and store the tuple
• When the adversary sends (received PUF , sid, P i ) to F PUF , check if the tuple (received PUF , sid, P i ) exists in L. If not, return to the waiting state. Else, write this tuple to the communication input tape of P i . The high-level idea behind our protocol. The protocol is shown in Figure 2 . We start providing the high-level idea of the protocol, and then we show how to actually implement it. To commit to a bit, the committer C sends a (regular 6 ) commitment of that bit over the channel, while it sends the opening of such commitment to a PUF received from the receiver R. The idea is that the simulator will observe the adversary's PUF queries (i.e., the opening of the regular commitment) and extract the committer's bit. To enforce C to query the PUF before the commitment phase is over (otherwise simulator will not be able to extract), we require it to also send the commitment to the answer that the PUF gives on input the opening of the commitment. Note that the committer can not send the answer itself as the PUF is malicious. Later, in the decommitment phase, the committer will send the openings of both commitments: the commitment of the bit and the commitment of the answer of the PUF. By the binding of commitment scheme, and by the unpredictability of PUFs, the committer is forced to query the PUF with the valid opening already in the commitment phase, in order to be able to provide an accepting decommitment phase. Hence, the simulator extracts the bit committed with all but negligible probability. Thus, this is an extractable commitment scheme. Now let us look at a malicious receiver. In this case, the simulator needs to equivocate. To achieve this, instead of using a regular commitment as described above, we use an equivocal regular commitment from the committer to the receiver. The problem is that the simulator must equivocate in straight line. To achieve this, we augment an existing equivocal commitment scheme in the standard model with the use of PUFs to get the desired result. In particular, we use the equivocal commitment scheme from [CO99], which in turn is based on Naor's scheme [Nao89]. Naor's scheme consists of two messages, where the fist message is a randomly chosen string r that the receiver sends to the committer. The scheme has the property that if the string r is crafted appropriately, then the commitment is equivocal. Di Crescenzo and Ostrovsky [CO99] show how this can be achieved by adding a coin-tossing phase before the commitment. To make this approach work in our case, we need to implement the coin tossing in such a way that a straight-line simulator can force the output to the desired result. In particular, the coin tossing in the scheme of [CO99] proceeds as follows: the receiver commits to a random string α (using a statistically hiding commitment scheme), the committer sends a string β, and then the receiver opens the commitment, so that the Naor parameter is set as α ⊕ β. The simulator would be able to equivocate if it can extract the value α committed by R, before having to send β. For this purpose, we construct a straight-line extractable statistically hiding commitment scheme in the malicious PUF model. This scheme follows the idea of our extractable commitment described above but is tailored to be also statistically-hiding. It will be used by the receiver to commit to α. Once the string r is properly crafted, the simulator completes the commitment phase as follows: 1) it commits to a random bit, 2) it does not query the PUF with the opening of such commitment (indeed, since we are in the malicious PUF model, querying the PUF more that an honest party would do, can be fatal for the simulation), 3) it commits to a random string instead of the answer of the PUF. In the decommitment phase, once it receives the bit b to open to, the simulator plays the decommitment as follows. It first computes the equivocation of the commitment of the bit such that it opens to b, then it queries the PUF with such decommitment and obtains the answer. Finally it computes the equivocation of the commitment of the string, such that it opens to the answer received from the PUF.
The final construction consists of the extractable commitment of α sent by R to C, the message β sent by C to R and the extractable/equivocal commitment of the bit, and the answer of the PUF, sent by C to R.
The protocol sketched so far involves back-and-forth for PUFs. This is because the protocol involves a party P i committing to the response of a random query (secret to P j ) to the PUF created by P j , and then later proving that it had indeed committed to the correct response. However, because of unpredictability, to check the correctness of such response, P j needs to query its own PUF and this involves P i sending the PUF back to P j . In the actual implementation we show how to overcome this problem.
The actual implementation. The receiver starts by querying its PUF with a pair of queries (q 0 , q 1 ), and then sends the PUF to C. Then, to commit to a bit b the committer queries the PUF with query q b (instead of the opening of the commitment of b), and sends to R only the commitment of the answer received from the PUF. C obtains the desired query q b by running an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol with R. The simulator can extract the bit by checking the queries sent to the PUF and looking which one is close enough, in hamming distance, to either q 0 or q 1 . Due to the security of OT, C can not get both queries (thus confusing the simulator), neither R can detect which query has been transferred. This idea improves the straight-line extractable commitment scheme discussed above (for now just consider the originally proposed computationally hiding version) since this implementation does not require back-and-forth of PUFs. Implementing the statistically-binding straight-line extractable and equivocal commitment Com equiv . Using the above implementation of a straight-line extractable (computationally hiding) commitment scheme that avoids back-and-forth of PUFs, new issues arises. The first issue concerns the equivocation. Indeed, now the simulator has to query the token with a particular string, chosen by the receiver, and it has to choose it already in the commitment phase, when it does not know yet which is the bit to open to. We overcome this difficulty as follows. After C has sent its commitment of the answer, R reveals both queries (q 0 , q 1 ) and also randomness used to run the OT protocol. In this way the simulator gets both strings and, in the opening phase, will query the PUF with the one corresponding to the bit to open. Another subtle issue is the selective abort of a malicious PUF. If the PUF aborts when queried with a particular string, then we have that the sender would abort already in the commitment phase, while the simulator aborts only in the decommitment phase. We avoid such problem by requiring that the sender continues the commitment phase also in case the PUF aborts, by committing to a random value. The above protocol is statistically binding (we are using Naor's commitment), straight-line extractable, and, assuming that Naor's parameter is decided by the output of the coin flipping, it is also straight-line equivocal. Since to commit to a bit we are basically committing to the l-bit string answer of the PUF, the size of Naor's parameter is N = (3n)l. We denote such a protocol as Com equiv . The formal specification of the protocol is given in Figure 7 , and the proof is shown in Appendix B.2. Implementing the statistically-hiding extractable commitment scheme Com shext . Another issue concerns the fact that, in order to use the arguments for binding of Naor's commitment, we need that the extractable commitment sent by the receiver, i.e., the commitment of the string α for the coin flipping, to be statistically hiding. Thus we can not reuse the same protocol Com equiv discussed above. We will obtain the desired scheme by applying following modification to the straight-line extractable (but only computationally hiding) commitment scheme that avoids back-and-forth of PUFs, as we discussed above.
First, the answer received from the PUF is committed using a statistically hiding commitment scheme, and the OT protocol must be such that the receiver's privacy is statistical. Second, after the commitment, the receiver (that is playing as committer for α) has to provide a statistical zeroknowledge argument of knowledge of the message committed. This turns out to be necessary to argue about binding. Such protocol is statistically hiding and straight-line extractable. We denote such a protocol as Com shext . The formal specification of Com shext is given in Figure 6 , while the formal proof is shown in Appendix B.1.
The final protocol Com uc = (C uc , R uc ) is shown in Figure 2 and consists of the receiver committing to α using the statistically hiding straight-line extractable commitment scheme Com shext = (C shext , R shext ), the sender choosing β and the result of the coin flipping, σ = α ⊕ β, is used as common input to run the statistically binding straight-line extractable and straight-line equivocal Com equiv = (C equiv , R equiv )(σ). The protocol needs two PUFs (one for each party) that are exchanged only at the beginning of the protocol.
is a statistically hiding straight-line extractable commitment scheme in the malicious PUF model, and Com equiv = (C equiv , R equiv ) is a statistically binding straight-line extractable and equivocal commitment scheme in the malicious PUF model, then Pro- Figure 2 , UC-realizes the F com functionality.
The proof is provided in Appendix C.1. The above protocol can be used to implement the multiple commitment functionality F mcom by using independent PUFs for each commitment. Note that in our construction we can not reuse the same PUF when multiple commitments are executed concurrently 7 . The reason is that, in both sub-protocols Com shext , Com equiv , in the opening phase the committer forwards the answer obtained by querying the receiver's PUF. The answer of a malicious PUF can then convey information about the value committed in concurrent sessions that have not been opened yet.
When implementing F mcom one should also deal with malleability issues. In particular, one should handle the case in which the man-in-the-middle adversary forwards honest PUFs to another party. However such attack can be easily ruled out by exploiting the unpredictability of honest PUFs as follows. Let P i be the creator of the PUF i , running an execution of the protocol with P j . Before delivering its own PUF, P i queries it with the identity of P j concatenated with a random nonce. Then, at some point during the protocol execution with P j it will ask P j to evaluate PUF i on such nonce (and the identity). Due to the unpredictability of PUFs, and the fact that nonce is a randomly chosen values, P j is able to answer to such a query only if it possesses the PUF.
The final step to obtain UC security for any functionality consists in using the compiler of [CLOS02], which only needs a UC secure implementation of the F mcom functionality.
Honest PUFs with Oblivious Queries
We describe a more relaxed (we consider stronger adversaries) PUF access model in this section. In particular, we study the question: what is the power of the simulator in the PUF-model? In their original formulation, Brzuska et al. ([BFSK11] ) made the model non-programmable. Their motivation was that PUFs are intrinsically non-programmable in the sense that even the manufacturer does not have control over the PUF functionality. Moreover, as a PUF is considered to implement a physical process, it can not be assumed that a PPT simulator will be able to reproduce that distribution indistinguishably. Thus, the simulator must answer the adversary's queries faithfully by forwarding them to the PUF.
A different axis along which we can analyze the power of the simulator is whether it can observe the queries made by the adversary to the PUF or not. The protocols in Brzuska et al. ([BFSK11] ) crucially rely on the simulator's ability to observe the adversary's queries to the PUF.
We consider a relaxation of the model where the simulator may not observe the adversary's queries. Our motivation of this model comes from the possibility of an adversary to maliciously run the Eval process. Even for an honest PUF, an adversary may use a different physical process (that is, different from the prescribed procedure Eval) to obtain an obfuscated query-response pair that is hidden from anyone observing the system. Indeed, as PUFs are generated by a known physical process, we assume that the adversary has a non black-box access to the PUF. Thus a more realistic model would be allowing the adversary's queries to remain hidden from the simulator. In particular this is the case when considering the UC framework and the fact that the simulator does not know the code of the environment, and the environment can use the adversary as a proxy, therefore using procedures to query the PUF that are not understood by the simulator. See Section 1 for a more detailed discussion.
Formally, we consider the original PUF ideal functionality of Brzuska et al [BFSK11], which we call F hPUF for honest PUFs. We construct an unconditional UC protocol for Oblivious Transfer functionality in the F hPUF -hybrid model and show an ideal model simulator that has the following property: the simulation strategy is oblivious to the adversary's PUF queries. When the adversary makes a PUF query, the simulator sends it to F hPUF , and sends the response back to the adversary. However, the simulator's next message function does not depend upon the query or the response. We call such simulators oblivious-query simulators. The ideal functionality F hPUF is described in Figure 9 in Appendix E.
Before we begin, we address one final technical issue concerning oblivious-query simulators. As the simulator can not observe the adversary's PUF queries, it must determine its own queries to the PUF only from the transcript (it is clear that the simulator must query the PUF, else we are in the plain model where UC is impossible). Now in the real physical world, a party that receives a PUF may certainly destroy it after using it. To model this behaviour, we ought to augment our PUF ideal functionality with a kill message, that destroys a PUF so that no party may query that particular PUF anymore. Let us call this the augmented − F hPUF hybrid model. However, this creates a problem for the oblivious-query simulator. Consider an adversary the destroys a PUF as soon as it queries it, i.e., before sending any message. Now, by the time the simulator determines what to ask the PUF, the PUF is already dead and can not be accessed and the simulator is stuck. This attack must be handled explicitly in the protocol.
However, there exists a simple compiler that transforms a protocol in F hPUF hybrid model (where parties are not allowed to send kill message to F hPUF ) to a protocol in the augmented − F hPUF hybrid model where parties are allowed to destroy PUFs. The point is that it is straight forward for party P j to check if a party P i still possesses a PUF that P j had sent it earlier: before handing over the PUF, party P j queries the PUF with a random query, say q, and obtains the response, and then hands over the PUF to P i . When party P j wishes to check if P i still possesses the PUF (and hasn't destroyed it by sending a kill message), party P j simply sends q to P i and compares the responses. If P i is no longer in possession of the PUF (because it had sent a kill message earlier), by the unpredictability of PUFs, it will not be able to give the correct response, and P j will abort.
The compiler works as follows: given any protocol in F hPUF hybrid model, the protocol in augmented − F hPUF follows the same steps as the original protocol, except that after every round of the original protocol, each party verifies that all the recipients of its PUFs are still in possession of those PUFs. Having this compiler in mind, and for the sake of simplicity of notation, we present our protocol in the F hPUF hybrid model.
Unconditional OT in the Oblivious Query Model
In this section, we construct an unconditional UC protocol for OT in the oblivious-query PUF model. Recall that in this model, the simulator can not use the queries that an adversary makes to the PUF. We begin with the original OT protocol of Brzuska et al. [BFSK11] , and identify the sections of the protocol where the simulator needs to observe the adversary's queries to extract its input. We then modify these parts by embedding extra information in the transcript which allows extraction without observing the queries. Because of this added information, we also need to add more consistency checks for the final protocol to work. In the following, we give an informal overview of the original protocol of Brzuska et al. [BFSK11] , and then describe these steps in more detail. A formal description of our protocol is given in Figure 3 .
Overview of the Brzuska et al. [BFSK11]
OT protocol. The protocol starts with the receiver initializing a PUF, say sid R , and querying it on a random query q to obtain response a. The receiver now hands over sid R to the sender and can not make any more queries. Now the idea is that the sender will pick two queries such that the receiver knows the response to only one of them. This is done by the sender picking two random queries x 0 , x 1 sending them to the receiver, who responds with v = x b ⊕ q, where b is receiver's input. Now, of the two queries v ⊕ x 0 and v ⊕ x 1 , the receiver knows the response to only one, while the sender has no information about which response the receiver knows. The sender uses the responses to these queries to mask its strings and the receiver can "decrypt" only one of them.
Extracting from Sender without observing queries. This is already possible in the original protocol. Note that the sender masks its strings by responses to the queries v ⊕ x 0 and v ⊕ x 1 . Both of these queries can be determined from the transcript. The simulator obtains responses to both of these, and thus "decrypts" both the strings. We use the same strategy in our protocol.
Extracting from Receiver without observing queries. Consider an adversary that corrupts the receiver. Informally, the simulator in the original protocol of [BFSK11] keeps a list of the queries made by the adversary. When it receives the value v from the adversary, it checks which of v ⊕ x 0 and v ⊕ x 1 is in that list 8 . If it is the former, then the adversary's bit is 0, else it is 1. Thus, the simulator relies crucially on observability of queries.
To tackle this, we simply ask the receiver to send, along with v, a query d whose response is the receiver's bit 9 . There are several issues to handle here: Whose PUF can be used? Note that at the time the receiver sends v to the sender, receiver's PUF is already with the sender. Thus, the query d can not be sent to receiver's PUF anymore, otherwise the sender can evaluate the PUF on d and obtain the receiver's bit. Instead, we make the sender send a PUF, say sid S , in the beginning of the protocol to the receiver. The receiver queries sid S with random queries till it finds a query d whose response is its secret bit. Then it sends d along with v, and because it still holds sid S , the sender can not query it on d, and receiver's bit is hidden. However, the simulator can query sid S with d and extract receiver's bit. Forcing Receiver to use correct queries: Cut-and-Choose. Of course, a malicious receiver might not use a query d that corresponds to its bit. In this case, the simulator will extract an incorrect bit. However, we can use cut-and-choose to enforce correct behaviour on the receiver. Let k be a statistical security parameter. The sender sends 2k PUFs, say sid
, and 2k pairs (x 0 1 , x 1 1 ), . . . , (x 0 2k , x 1 2k ), to the receiver after receiving its PUF sid R . The receiver chooses random bits b 1 , . . . , b 2k and prepares v i and d i according to b i (that is, v i = q i ⊕ x b i for some query q i , and the response of d i to PUF sid S i is the bit b i .) Now the sender asks the receiver to "reveal" k of these indices chosen at random. To reveal an index i, the receiver sends the query q i , along with its response (from PUF sid R ) a i , and also hands over the PUF sid 
, such that for almost all pairs, (1) the receiver knows the response (of sid R ) to only one query in each pair, and the sender does not know which query the receiver knows, and (2) the simulator knows the query whose response is known by the receiver. Now we run the original OT protocol of Brzuska et al.
[BFSK11] on these pairs to implement k random OTs. As the final step, we use the well-known reduction from random OTs to OT. The proof of the following theorem is deferred to Appendix C.2. (b) (S uncOT ⇐ R uncOT )For each 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, receiver does the following:
• select random bit b i ∈ {0, 1}.
• select random query d i and let da i be the response of the PUF sid
, dp i ).
(c) (S uncOT ⇒ R uncOT )Sender selects a random subset S ⊂ [2k] of size k and sends it to receiver.
(d) (S uncOT ⇐ R uncOT )For all j ∈ S, receiver sends (q j , a j ) to sender, and also hands over the PUF sid S j to the sender. (e) Sender makes the following checks for each j ∈ S:
• compute the response of PUF sid R on query q j to obtain a *
• query the PUF sid • for δ ∈ {0, 1}, choose random strings s • for δ ∈ {0, 1} and 1 Theorem 2. The protocol (S uncOT , R uncOT ) in Figure 3 , UC-realizes the F OT functionality in the F PUF -hybrid model.
Unconditional Security with Malicious PUFs
We turn our attention back to the malicious PUF model. In Section 3.2 we provided a computational commitment scheme using malicious PUFs. This combined with the results in Canetti et al.
[CLOS02] gives us computational UC security with malicious PUFs. The natural question to ask is whether we can leverage the power of PUFs to obtain unconditional UC security. We leave this as an intriguing open question for future work. As evidence that this endeavour might be fruitful, in this section we provide a statistically hiding and statistically binding commitment scheme.
Our protocol is the straightforward adaptation of Naor's commitment protocol [Nao89] in the malicious PUFs model. The sender first queries the PUF with a random string and then sends the PUF to the receiver. Then, as in Naor's protocol, the receiver sends a random string, and finally the sender sends either the response of the PUF to the random query 10 , or the response of the PUF to the random query XORed with the string sent by the receiver, depending on whether the bit to be committed is 0 or 1. By extraction independence, it follows that receiver's view in the two cases is identical. To argue binding, we note that the binding argument in Naor's commitment relies only on the expansion property of the PRG. Thus, if we choose the PUF family and a matching fuzzy extractor family of appropriate length, the same argument holds in our case. The formal description of the protocol, along with security proofs, are given in Appendix D.
[ 
A Missing Definitions and Tools
Notation. A function is negligible in n (or just negligible) if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value n 0 ∈ N such that for all n > n 0 it holds that (n) < 1/p(n).
In the following definitions we assume that parties are stateful and that malicious parties obtain auxiliary inputs, although for better readability we omit them.
Indistinguishability. Let W be a set of strings. An ensemble of random variables X = {X w } w∈W is a sequence of random variables indexed by elements of W.
Definition 5. Two ensembles of random variables X = {X w } w∈W and Y = {Y w } w∈W are computationally indistinguishable (resp., statistically indistinguishable), i.e., {X w } w∈W C ≡ {Y w } w∈W (resp., {X w } w∈W S ≡ {Y w } w∈W ) if for any polynomial-sized circuit (resp., unbounded) D there exists a negligible function such that
A.1 Commitment Schemes
Definition 6 (Bit Commitment Scheme). A commitment scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms Com = (C, R) implementing the following two-phase functionality. Given to C an input b ∈ {0, 1}, in the first phase (commitment phase) C interacts with R to commit to the bit b, we denote this interaction as ((c, d), c) ← C(com, b), R(recv) where c is the transcript of the commitment phase and d is the decommitment. In the second phase (opening phase) C sends (b, d) and R finally accepts or rejects according to (c, b, d).
Com = (C, R) is a commitment scheme if it satisfies the following properties.
Completeness. If C and R follow their prescribed strategy then R will always accept (with probability 1).
Statistical (resp., Computational) Hiding. For every (resp., PPT) R * the ensembles {view R * (C(com, 0), R * ) (1 n )} n∈N and {view R * (C(com, 0), R * ) (1 n )} n∈N are statistically (resp., computationally) indistinguishable, where view R * (C(com, b), R * ) denotes the view of R * in the commit stage interacting with C(com, b).
Statistical (resp., Computational) Binding. For every (resp., PPT) C * , there exists a negligible function such that the malicious sender C * succeeds in the following game with probability at most (n): On security parameter 1 n , C * interacts with R in the commit stage obtaining the transcript c . Then C * outputs pairs (0, d 0 ) and (1, d 1 ), and succeeds if in the opening phase,
It will be helpful to consider commitment schemes in which the committer and receiver take an additional common input, denoted by σ. This additional common input is drawn fresh for each execution from a specified distribution. In our case, this additional common input is always drawn from the uniform distribution of appropriate length. We will denote such commitment schemes with Com = (C, R)(σ). The properties of Definition 6 are required to hold over the random choice of σ.
Definition 7 (Straight-line Equivocal Commitment Scheme.). A commitment scheme Com = (C, R)(σ) with common input σ, is a straight-line equivocal commitment scheme if there exists a straight-line strict polynomial-time simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) such that for any b ∈ {0, 1}, and for all PPT R * , the output of the following two experiments is computationally indistinguishable:
Note that in this definition, the verification of the receiver R is computed upon the common input also.
Definition 8 (Straight-line Extractable Commitment Scheme in the Malicious PUF model).
A commitment scheme Com = (C, R) is a straight-line extractable commitment scheme in the malicious PUF model if there exists a straight-line strict polynomial-time extractor E that, having on-line access to the queries made by any PPT malicious committer C * to the PUFs sent by the honest receiver R, and running only the commitment phase, it outputs a bit b such that:
-(simulation) the views view C * (C * (com, ), R(recv)) and view C * (C * (com, ), E) are identical; -(extraction) let c be the transcript obtained from the commitment phase run between C * and E. If c is accepting then b = ⊥. -(binding) if b = ⊥ the probability that C * decommit to a bit b = b is negligible.
A.2 Statistical Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge
A polynomial-time relation R is a relation for which it is possible to verify in time polynomial in |x| whether R(x, w) = 1. Let us consider an NP-language L and denote by R L the corresponding polynomial-time relation such that x ∈ L if and only if there exists w such that R L (x, w) = 1. We will call such a w a valid witness for x ∈ L. We will denote by Prob r [ X ] the probability of an event X over coins r.
Interactive proof/argument systems with efficient prover strategies. An interactive proof (resp., argument) system for a language L is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithms P and V , satisfying the requirements of completeness and soundness. Informally, completeness requires that for any x ∈ L, at the end of the interaction between P and V , where P has as input a valid witness for x ∈ L, V rejects with negligible probability. Soundness requires that for any x ∈ L, for any (resp., any polynomial-sized) circuit P * , at the end of the interaction between P * and V , V accepts with negligible probability. We denote by out( P (w), V (x)) the output of the verifier V when interacting on common input x with prover P that also receives as additional input a witness w for x ∈ L. Moreover we denote by out( P * , V (x)) the output of the verifier V when interacting on common input x with an adversarial prover P * .
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 9. A pair of interactive algorithms P (·), V (·) (·) is an interactive proof (resp., argument) system for the language L, if V runs in probabilistic polynomial-time and 1. Completeness: For every x ∈ L, |x| = n, and for every NP witness w for x ∈ L Pr [ out( P (w), V (x) = 1 ] = 1.
2. Soundness (resp. computational soundness): For every (resp., every polynomial-sized) circuit family {P * n } n∈N there exists a negligible function (·) such that
for every x ∈ L of size n.
Argument of knowledge. Informally, a proof system is an argument of knowledge if for any probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithm prover P * that convinces an honest verifier with non-negligible probability, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm called the extractor, that outputs a valid witness for the statement proved by P * with roughly equivalent probability. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 10. (adapted from [BG93] with negligible knowledge error) A proof (resp., argument) system P (·), V (x) for an NP-language L is a proof (resp., argument) system of knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm E such that for every (resp., every polynomialsized) circuit family {P * n } n∈N , there exists a negligible function such that for any x of size n, if
and the expected running time of E is polynomial in |x|.
Zero knowledge. The classical notion of zero knowledge has been introduced in [GMR89]. In a zero-knowledge argument system a prover can prove the validity of a statement to a verifier without releasing any additional information. This concept is formalized by requiring the existence of an expected polynomial-time algorithm, called the simulator, whose output is indistinguishable from the view of the verifier.
Definition 11. An interactive argument system P (·, ·), V (·) for a language L is computational (resp., statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge if for all polynomial-time verifiers V * , there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm S such that the following ensembles are computationally (resp., statistically, perfectly) indistinguishable:
view V * ((P (w), V * (z))(x)) x∈L,w∈W (x),z∈{0,1} * and {S(x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} * .
A.3 The UC framework and the Ideal Functionalities
For simplicity, we define the two-party protocol syntax, and then informally review the two-party UC-framework, which can be extended to the multi-party case. For more details, see [Can01].
Protocol syntax. Following [GMR89] and [Gol01]
, a protocol is represented as a system of probabilistic interactive Turing machines (ITMs), where each ITM represents the program to be run within a different party. Specifically, the input and output tapes model inputs and outputs that are received from and given to other programs running on the same machine, and the communication tapes model messages sent to and received from the network. Adversarial entities are also modeled as ITMs. The construction of a protocol in the UC-framework proceeds as follows: first, an ideal functionality is defined, which is a "trusted party" that is guaranteed to accurately capture the desired functionality. Then, the process of executing a protocol in the presence of an adversary and in a given computational environment is formalized. This is called the real-life model. Finally, an ideal process is considered, where the parties only interact with the ideal functionality, and not amongst themselves. Informally, a protocol realizes an ideal functionality if running of the protocol amounts to "emulating" the ideal process for that functionality.
Let Π = (P 1 , P 2 ) be a protocol, and F be the ideal-functionality. We describe the ideal and real world executions.
The real-life process. The real-life process consists of the two parties P 1 and P 2 , the environment Z, and the adversary A. Adversary A can communicate with environment Z and can corrupt any party. When A corrupts party P i , it learns P i 's entire internal state, and takes complete control of P i 's input/output behavior. The environment Z sets the parties' initial inputs. Let REAL Π,A,Z be the distribution ensemble that describes the environment's output when protocol Π is run with adversary A.
We also consider a G-hybrid model, where the real-world parties are additionally given access to an ideal functionality G. During the execution of the protocol, the parties can send inputs to, and receive outputs from, the functionality G. We will use REAL G Π,A,Z to denote the distribution of the environment's output in this hybrid execution.
The ideal process. The ideal process consists of two "dummy parties"P 1 andP 2 , the ideal functionality F, the environment Z, and the ideal world adversary Sim, called the simulator. In the ideal world, the uncorrupted dummy parties obtain their inputs from environment Z and simply hand them over to F. As in the real world, adversary Sim can corrupt any party. Once it corrupts partŷ P i , it learnsP i 's input, and takes complete control of its input/output behavior. Let IDEAL F Sim,Z be the distribution ensemble that describes the environment's output in the ideal process.
Definition 12. (UC-Realizing an Ideal Functionality) Let F be an ideal functionality, and Π be a protocol. We say Π realizes F in the G-hybrid model if for any hybrid-model PPT adversary A, there exists an ideal process expected PPT adversary Sim such that for every PPT environment Z,
Oblivious Transfer Functionality. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a two-party game in which a sender holds a pair of strings (s 0 , s 1 ), and a receiver needs to obtain one string according to its input bit b. The transfer of the desired string is oblivious in the sense that the sender does not know the string obtained by the receiver, while the receiver obtaining one string gains no information about the other one. The OT Functionality F OT is shown in Fig. 4 . Functionality F OT F OT running with an oblivious sender S a receiver R and an adversary Sim proceeds as follows:
• Upon receiving a message (send, sid, s 0 , s 1 , S, R) from S where each s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} n , record the tuple (sid,s 0 , s 1 ) and send (send, sid) to R and Sim. Ignore any subsequent send messages. Functionality F com F com running with parties P 1 , . . . , P m and an adversary Sim proceeds as follows:
• Commitment Phase: Upon receiving a message (commit, sid, P i , P j , b) from P i where b ∈ {0, 1}, record the tuple (sid, P i , P j , b) and send the message (receipt, sid, P i , P j ) to P j and Sim. Ignore any subsequent commit messages.
• Decommit Phase: Upon receiving (open,sid, P i , P j ) from P i , if the tuple (sid, P i , P j , b) is recorded then send (open,sid, P i , P j , b) to P j and to Sim and halt. Otherwise halt. 
A.4 Security in presence of Malicious Adversary in the Stand-alone Model
In this paragraph we recall the definition of security in presence of malicious adversary in the standalone model. The security in the stand-alone model is defined as a comparison of the output of two experiments, the real-life experiment and the ideal process, as for the UC-model in Section A.3, except that, in the stand-alone model there is no environment Z. In this weaker model, REAL Π,A is defined as the output pair of the honest party and the adversary A from the real-life execution of Π (instead of the real-time view of the environment Z), while IDEAL F Sim , is defined as the output pair of the honest party and the ideal adversary Sim from the above ideal execution. In the following definition for simplicity of notation, we use the same notation used for definition of UC-security.
Definition 13. (Security in presence of Malicious adversary in the Stand-alone Model). Let F be an ideal functionality, and Π be a protocol. We say Π securely computes F with abort in presence of malicious adversary, if for any non-uniform adversary PPT A, there exists a non-uniform PPT ideal process adversary Sim such that
Stand-alone Secure Statistical Receiver Oblivious Transfer. A statistical receiver OT is an Oblivious Transfer protocol in which the security of the receiver is preserved statistically, and is one of the ingredients of our constructions: Com shext and Com equiv . One can obtain a statistical receiver string OT protocol from any statistical sender bit OT protocol as follows. First, from bit statistical sender OT obtain a bit statistical receiver OT, by applying the OT-reverse transformation shown by Wolf and Wullschleger in [WW06]. Then, obtain string statistical receiver OT from bit statistical receiver OT, by using the technique shown by Brassard et al. in [BCR86] . Finally note that a construction for stand-alone statistical sender bit OT is provided by Lindell and Hazay in [HL10] under the DDH assumption. In the rest of the paper we will write statistical receiver OT to refer to a stand-alone secure OT protocol in which the security of the receiver is preserved statistically.
B Sub-Protocols
In this section we show the main ingredients of Protocol Com uc , i.e., Protocol Com shext and Protocol Com equiv . For simplicity, in this section we use the following informal notation. We refer to a PUF created by party A as PUF A , and we denote by v ← PUF A (q) the evaluation of the PUF PUF A on challenge q. An example of the formal notation involving the invocation of the ideal functionality F PUF is provide in Section D.
B.1 Statistically Hiding Straight-line Extractable Commitment Scheme.
Let Com SH = (C SH , R SH ) be a Statistically Hiding string commitment scheme, (S OT , R OT ) be a statistical receiver OT protocol (namely, an OT protocol where the receiver's privacy is statistically preserved). Let (P, V ) be a Statistical Zero Knowledge Argument of Knowledge (SZKAoK) for the following relation: Fig.6 .
is run by R shext as S OT with input (q 0 , q 1 ), and C shext as R OT with input b. Let q b be the local output of C shext .
is run by C shext as C SH to commit to a b , and by R shext as R SH .
is run by C shext playing as prover P for the theorem (c, (c, d)) ∈ R com and by R shext playing as verifier V on input c. If the proof is not accepting, R shext aborts.
Decommitment Phase a 0 , a 1 ) . To commit to a bit b, C shext has to commit to the output a b of PUF R . By the completeness of the OT protocol, C shext obtains the query q b corresponding to its secret bit. Then C shext queries PUF R with q b and commits to the response a b running C SH . Furthermore, C shext proves using SZKAoK the knowledge of the opening. By the completeness of SZKAoK and Com SH the commitment phase is concluded without aborts. In the opening phase, C shext sends b and opens the commitment to a b , and R shext checks whether the string a b matches the answer a b obtained by its own PUF applying the fuzzy extractor. By the response consistency property, R shext gets the correct answer and accept the decommitment for the bit b.
Statistically Hiding. We show that, for all R * shext it holds that:
. This follows from the statistical security of the three sub-protocols run in the commitment phase by C shext . More specifically, recall that the view of R * shext in the commitment phase consists of the transcript of the execution of the OT protocol (S OT , R OT ), the transcript of the Statistically Hiding commitment scheme Com SH and the transcript of the execution of the SZKAoK protocol. The proof goes by hybrids.
H 0 : In this hybrid the sender C shext commits to bit 0. Namely, it plays the OT protocol with the bit 0 to obtain q 0 , then it queries the malicious PUF * R to obtain a string a 0 , then it commits to a 0 executing C SH and finally it runs the honest prover P to prove knowledge of the decommitment.
H 1 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 0 , except that it executes the zero knowledge protocol by running the zero knowledge simulator S. By the statistical zero knowledge property of (P, V ), hybrids H 0 and H 1 are statistically indistinguishable.
H 2 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 1 , excepts that it runs C SH to commit to a random string s instead of a 0 . By the statistically hiding property of protocol Com SH , hybrids H 1 and H 2 are statistically indistinguishable.
H 3 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 2 , except that in OT protocol it plays with bit 1, obtaining query q 1 . By the receiver security of protocol (S OT , R OT ), hybrids H 2 and H 3 are statistically indistinguishable.
H 4 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 3 , except that here it queries the PUF with string q 1 to obtain a 1 (however it still commits to the random string s). If the PUF * R aborts, then C shext sets a 1 ← {0, 1} l . Note that any malicious behavior does not effect the transcript generated in H 4 . Thus, hybrids H 3 and H 3 are identical.
H 5 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 4 except that it commits to the string a 1 . By the statistically hiding property of protocol Com SH , hybrids H 4 and H 5 are statistically indistinguishable.
H 6 : In this hybrid, C shext proceeds as in H 5 , except that it executes the zero knowledge protocol running as the honest prover P . By the statistical zero knowledge property of (P, V ), hybrids H 5 and H 6 are statistically indistinguishable.
By observing that hybrid H 0 corresponds to the case in which C shext commits to 0 and hybrid H 6 corresponds to the case in which C shext commits to 1, the hiding property is proved. Straight-line Extractability. To prove extractability we show a straight-line strict polynomialtime extractor E that satisfies the properties required by Definition 8. Recall that, in the commitment scheme Com shext , the sender basically commits to the answer a b received from PUF R . By the unpredictability of PUF, the sender needs to get the right query q b from R shext in order to obtain the value to commit to. Such q b is obliviously retrieved by C shext running OT with the bit b. The strategy of the extractor, that we show below, is very simple. It consists of running the commitment phase as the honest receiver, and then looking at the queries made by C * shext to PUF R to detect which among q 0 , q 1 has been asked and thus extract the bit. The extraction of the bit fails when one of the following two cases happens. Case Fail1: the set of queries contains both (q 0 , q 1 ) (or at least a pair that is within their hamming distance); in this case E cannot tell which is the bit played by C * shext and therefore outputs ⊥. By the sender's security of OT this case happens only with negligible probability. Case Fail2: the set of queries does not contain any query close (within hamming distance) to neither q 0 nor q 1 . This is also a bad case since E cannot extract any information. However, if there exists such a C * shext that produces an accepting commitment without querying the PUF in the commitment phase (but perhaps it makes queries in the decommitment phase only) then, given that responses of honest PUFs are unpredictable, one can break either the binding property of the underlying commitment scheme Com SH or the argument of knowledge property of (P, V ). The formal description of E is given below. Formal arguments follow.
Extractor E Commitment Phase. Run the commitment phase following the honest receiver procedure. We denote by (q 0 , q 1 ) the queries made by the extractor E to the honest PUF before delivering it to C * shext . E uses such a pair when running as S OT in OT protocol. If all sub-protocols (OT, Com SH , SZKAoK) are successfully completed go the extraction phase. Else, abort.
Extraction phase. Let Q be the set of queries asked by C * shext to PUF R during the commitment phase.
Fail1. If there exists a pair
The above extractor E satisfies the following three properties.
Simulation. E follows the procedure of the honest receiver R shext . Thus the view of C * shext playing with E is identical to the view of C * shext playing with R shext . Extraction. Let τ c the transcript of the commitment phase. For the extraction property we have to show that if τ c is accepting, then the probability that E outputs ⊥ is negligible. Note that E outputs ⊥ if and only if one of the event between Fail1 and Fail2 happens. Thus,
In the following we show that, if τ c is accepting, then
Proof. Assume that there exists a PPT C * shext such that event Fail1 happens with non-negligible probability δ. Then it is possible to construct R * OT that uses C * shext to break the sender's security of the OT protocol. R * OT interacts with an external OT sender S OT , on input auxiliary information z = (s 0 , s 1 ), while it runs C * shext internally. R * OT initializes and sends PUF R to C * shext , then it runs the OT protocol forwarding the messages received from the external sender S OT to C * shext and vice versa. When the OT protocol is completed, R * OT continues the internal execution with C * shext emulating the honest receiver. When the commitment phase is successfully completed, R * OT analyses the set Q of queries made by C * shext to PUF R . If there exists a pair (q 0 , q 1 ) within hamming distance with strings (s 0 , s 1 ) then R * OT outputs (s 0 , s 1 ), therefore breaking the sender's security of OT with probability δ (indeed, there exists no simulator that can simulate such attack since in the ideal world Sim gets only one input among (s 0 , s 1 )). Since by assumption (S OT , R OT ) is a stand-alone secure OT protocol, δ must be negligible.
Proof. If transcript τ c is accepting then it holds that C * shext in the decommitment phase will send a tuple (b, d, a b ) for which, given τ c , the receiver R shext accepts, i.e., the opening (d) of the statistically hiding commitment is valid and corresponds to an answer (a b ) of PUF R upon one of the queries played by the R shext in the OT protocol. Formally,
Toward a contradiction, assume that Pr [ Fail2 ] = δ and is not-negligible. Recall that the event Fail2 happens when C * shext successfully completed the commitment phase, without querying PUF R with any of (q 0 , q 1 ). Given that τ c is accepting, let (b, d, a b ) be an accepting decommitment, we have the following cases:
1. C * shext honestly committed to the correct a b without having queried PUF R . By the unpredictability of PUF R we have that this case has negligible probability to happen. 2. C * shext queries PUF R in the decommitment phase to obtain the value a b to be opened. Thus C * shext opens commitment c (sent in the commitment phase) as string a b . We argue that by the computational binding of Com SH and by the argument of knowledge property of (P, V ) this case also happens with negligible probability. First, we show and adversary C * SH that uses C * shext as a black-box to break the binding of the commitment scheme Com SH with probability δ. C * SH runs C * shext internally, simulating the honest receiver R shext to it, and forwarding only the messages belonging to Com SH to an external receiver R SH , and vice versa. Let c denote the transcript of Com SH . When the commitment phase of Com shext is successfully completed, and therefore C * shext has provided an accepting proof for the theorem (c, ·) ∈ R com , C * SH runs the extractor E P associated to the protocol (P, V ). By the argument of knowledge property, E P , having oracle access to C * shext , extracts the witness (ã b ,d) used by C * shext to prove theorem c ∈ R com w.h.p. If the witness extracted is not a valid decommitment of c, then C * shext can be used to break the soundness of (P, V ). Else, C * SH proceeds to the decommitment phase, and as by hypothesis of Lemma 2, since the commitment τ c is accepting, C * shext provides a valid opening (a b , d).
) are two valid openings for c then C * SH outputs such tuple breaking the binding property of Com SH with probability δ. If (ã b ,d) = (a b , d ) with non-negligible probability, then consider the following analysis. By assumption, event Fail2 happens when C * shext does not query PUF R with none among (q 0 , q 1 ). By the unpredictability property, it holds that without querying the PUF, C * shext cannot guess the values a b , thus w.h.p. the commitment c played by C * shext in the commitment phase, does not hide the value a b . However, since the output of the extraction is a valid opening for a b , then it must have been the case that in one of the rewinding attempts of the black-box extractor E P , C * shext has obtained a b by asking PUF R . Indeed, upon each rewind E P very luckily changes the messages played by the verifier of the ZK protocol, and C * shext could choose the queries for PUF R adaptively on such messages. However, recalling that E P is run by C * SH to extract from C * shext , C * SH can avoid such failure by following this strategy: when a rewinding thread leads C * shext to ask the PUF with query q b , then abort such thread and start a new one. By noticing that in the commitment phase, C * shext did not query the PUF with q b , we have that, by the argument of knowledge property of (P, V ) this event happens again in the rewinding threads w.h.p. Thus, by discarding the rewinding thread in which C * shext asks for query q b , C * SH is still be able to extract the witness in polynomial time (again, if this was not the case then one can use C * shext to break the argument of knowledge property). With this strategy, the event By the security of the OT protocol and by the computational binding of the commitment scheme Com SH , the above cases happen with negligible probability. Formal arguments follow previous discussions and are therefore omitted.
Lemma 3. Protocol Com shext is close under parallel repetition using the same PUF.
Sketch. The proof comes straightforwardly by the fact that all sub-protocols used in protocol Com shext are close under parallel repetition. However, issues can arise when the same, possibly malicious and stateful PUF, is reused. Note that, the output of the (malicious) PUF is statistically hidden in the commitment phase and that it is revealed only in the decommitment phase. Thus, any side information that is leaked by a dishonest PUF, cannot be used by the malicious creator, before the decommitment phase. At the decommitment stage however, the input of the committer is already revealed, and no more information is therefore gained by the malicious party. We stress out that re-usability is possible only when many instances of Com shext are run in parallel, i.e., only when all decommitment happen simultaneously. If decommitment phases are interleaved with commitment phase of other sessions, then reusing the same PUF, allow the malicious creator to gain information about sessions that are not open yet. To see why, let i and j be two concurrent executions. Assume that the commitment of i and j is done in parallel but session j is decommitted before session i. Then, a malicious PUF can send information on the bit committed in the session i through the string sent back for the decommitment of j.
Statistically Hiding Straight-line Extractable String Commitment Scheme. We obtain statistically hiding straight-line extractable string commitment scheme, for n-bit string, by running n execution of Com shext in parallel and reusing the same PUF. In the main protocol shown in Figure 2 we use the same notation Com shext to refer to a string commitment scheme.
B.2 Statistically Binding Straight-line Extractable and Equivocal Commitment
Scheme.
Let l = rg(n) be the range of the PUF, (S OT , R OT ) be a statistical receiver OT protocol and let G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 3n be a PRG. The commitment scheme that we present, takes as common input a stringr = r 1 , . . . , r l , that is uniformly chosen in the set ({0, 1} 3n ) l . This string can be seen as l distinct parameters for Naor's commitment, and indeed it is used to commit bit-by-bit to an l-bit string (i.e., the answer received from the PUF). Our statistically binding straight-line extractable and equivocal commitment scheme Com equiv = (C equiv , R equiv ) is depicted in Fig. 7 .
Theorem 4. If G is a PRG and (S OT , R OT ) is statistical receiver OT protocol, then Com equiv = (C equiv , R equiv ) is a statistically binding straight-line extractable and equivocal commitment scheme in the malicious PUFs model.
Proof. Completeness. It follows from the completeness of the OT protocol, the correctness of Naor's commitment and the response consistency property of PUFs with fuzzy extractors. To commit to the bit b, the sender C equiv is required to commit to the answer of PUF R on input q b . Therefore, C equiv runs the OT protocol with input b and obtains the query q b and thus the value to commit to using Naor's commitments. The correctness of OT guarantees that the consistency check performed by C equiv goes through. In the decommitment phase, the response consistency property along with correctness of Naor, allow the receiver R equiv to obtain the string a b and in therefore the bit decommitted to by C equiv .
Straight-line Extractability. Extractor E Commitment Phase. Run the commitment phase following the honest receiver procedure: E queries PUF R with (q 0 , q 1 ) before delivering it to C * equiv , and uses such a pair when running as S OT in OT protocol. If OT protocol is not successfully completed then abort. Else, let Q precom be the set of queries asked by C * equiv to PUF R before sending the commitments c 1 , . . . , c l to E. Upon receiving such commitments, do as follows: Committer's Input: Bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Common Input:r = (r 1 , . . . , r l ) Commitment Phase
3. handover PUF R to C equiv ; 4. choose random tape ran OT $ ← {0, 1} * .
is run by R equiv as S OT with input (q 0 , q 1 ) and randomness ran OT , while C equiv runs as R OT with input b. Let q b be the local output of C equiv , and τ OT be the transcript of the execution of the OT protocol.
C equiv :(Statistically Biding Commitment)
R equiv : upon receiving c 1 , . . . , c l , send ran OT , q 0 , q 1 to C equiv . 
If there exists
Finally sends ran OT , q 0 , q 1 to C * equiv . Simulation. E follows the procedure of the honest receiver R equiv . Thus the view of C * equiv playing with E is identical to the view of C * equiv playing with R equiv . Extraction. The proof of extraction follows from the same arguments shown in the proof of Theorem 3, and it is simpler since in protocol Com equiv we use statistically binding commitments (given that the common parameterr is uniformly chosen).
Let τ c the transcript of the commitment phase. For the extraction property we have to show that if τ c is accepting, then the probability that E outputs ⊥ is negligible. Note that E outputs ⊥ if and only if one event between Fail1 and Fail2 happens. Thus,
By the sender's security property of the OT protocol, event Fail1 happens with negligible probability. The formal proof follows the same arguments given in Lemma 1. Given that the common parameterr is uniformly chosen, we have that the Naor's commitments (i.e., c 1 , . . . , c l ) sent by C * equiv in the commitment phase, are statistically binding. Thus, by the unpredictability property of PUFs and the by the statistically biding property of Naor's commitment scheme, event Fail2 also happens with negligible probability only. Binding. Given that the common inputr is uniformly chosen, binding of Com equiv follows from the statistically binding property of Naor's commitment scheme. Straight-line Equivocality. In the following we show a straight-line simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) and we prove that the view generated by the interaction between S and R * equiv is computationally indistinguishable from the view generated by the interaction between C equiv and R * equiv .
-obtain PUF * R from R * equiv . -run OT protocol with input a random bitb; if the OT protocol is not successfully completed, abort. -computes commitments as follows: for i = 1, . . . , l,c i ← G(s i 0 ). Sendc 1 , . . . ,c l to R * equiv . -Obtain (ran OT , q 0 , q 1 ) from R * equiv and check if the transcript τ OT is consistent with it. If the check fails, abort. Else, output state 2 = {state 1 , (q 0 , q 1 )}. 
Lemma 4. If (S OT , R OT ) is a statistical receiver OT protocol and G is a pseudo-random generator, then for all PPT R * equiv it holds that, {out(Exp
Proof. The proof goes by hybrids arguments.
H 0 . This is the real world experiment Exp
H 1 . In this hybrid the common parameterr is chosen running algorithm S 1 . The only difference between experiment H 0 and H 1 is in the fact that in H 1 each string r i ∈r is pseudo-random. By the pseudo-randomness of PRG H 0 and H 1 are computationally indistinguishable.
H 2 . In this hybrid, the commitments c 1 , . . . , c l are computed as in S 2 , that is, for all i, c i corresponds to an evaluation of the PRG i.e., c i = G(s i 0 ), regardless of the bit that is committed. Then in the decommitment phase the sender uses knowledge of s i 1 , in case the i-th commitment of a b is the bit 1. (Each pair (s i 0 , s i 1 ) is inherited from the output of S 1 ). The difference between experiment H 1 and experiment H 2 is in the fact that in H 2 all commitments are pseudo-random, while in H 1 , pseudo-random values are used only to commit to bit 0. By the pseudo-randomness of PRG, experiments H 1 and H 2 are computationally indistinguishable. Note that in this experiment, the sender is not actually committing to the output obtained by querying PUF * R .
H 3 . In this experiment the sender queries PUF * R on input q b only in the decommitment phase. The only difference between this experiment and the previous one is that in H 3 , the sender is able to detect if PUF * R aborts, only in the decommitment phase. However, in experiment H 2 , if the PUF aborts, the sender continues the execution of the commitment phase, committing to a random string, ad aborts only in the decommitment phase. Therefore, hybrids H 2 and H 3 are identical.
H 4 . In this experiment, the sender executes the OT protocol with a random bitb, obtaining qb, but it does not use such a query to evaluate PUF * R . Instead it uses the string q b received from R * equiv in the last round of the commitment phase. We stress out that, due to the correctness of the OT protocol and to the statistical receiver's security, the case in which R * equiv plays the OT protocol with a pair (q b , qb) and then is able to compute randomness ran OT and a different pair ((q b , qb) that are still consistent with the transcript obtained in the OT execution, is statistically impossible . By the statistical receiver security of the OT protocol, H 3 and H 4 are statistically indistinguishable. 
C UC Security Proofs

C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we show that protocol Com uc = (C uc , R uc ) depicted in Figure 2 is UC-secure, by showing a PPT ideal world adversary Sim such that for all PPT environment Z, the view of the environment in the ideal process is indistinguishable from the view of the environment in the real process, in the F PUF hybrid model. Due to the straight-line extractability of Com shext and to the straight-line extractability and equivocality of Com equiv , showing such an simulator Sim is almost straightforward.
Receiver is corrupted. Let R * uc a malicious receiver. We show a PPT simulator Sim whose output is computational indistinguishable from the output obtained by R * uc when interacting with the honest committer C uc . The goal of Sim is to use the straight-line equivocator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) associated to protocol Com equiv . To accomplish that, Sim has to force the output of the coin flipping, to the parameter generated by S 1 . Once this is done, then Sim can use S 2 to complete the commitment phase, and S 3 to equivocate the commitment. In order to force the output of the coin flipping, Sim extracts the commitment of α sent by R * uc so that it can compute β appropriately. The extraction is done by running the extractor E C shext associated to the protocol Com shext .
Commitment Phase
-Run (r, state 1 ) ← S 1 (1 ln ).
-Execute protocol Com shext by running the associated extractor E C shext . If the output of the extractor is ⊥, then abort. Else, let α be the string extracted by E C shext . Set β =r ⊕ α , and send β to R * uc . If R * uc aborts, then abort. -When receiving the opening to α from R * uc , if the opening is not accepting, or if α = α then abort.
-Execute the commitment phase of protocol Com equiv , on common input α ⊕ β =r, by running S 2 (state 1 ), and obtain state 2 as local output.
Decommitment Phase
-On input the bit b. Execute the decommitment phase of protocol Com equiv by running S 3 (state 2 , b). -Output whatever R uc outputs.
Lemma 5. For all PPT real-world malicious receiver R * uc , for all PPT adversary Z, it holds that:
Proof. It follows from the straight-line extractability of Com shext and from the straight-line equivocality of Com equiv . By the straight-line extractability of Com shext it holds that, with overwhelming probability, Sim obtains the value α that will be later opened by R * uc , before it has to send the message β. Hence, Sim is able to force the output of the coin flipping to the value determined by S 1 . Then Sim just runs the simulator S 2 in the commitment phase, and S 3 in the decommitment phase. By the straightline equivocality property of Com equiv the view generated by the interaction between R * uc and Sim is computationally indistinguishable from the view generated by the interaction between R * uc and an honest sender C uc .
Committer is corrupted. In this case, the task of Sim is to extract the bit of the malicious committer C * uc already in the commitment phase. This task is easily accomplished by running the straight-line extractor E equiv associated to protocol Com equiv . However, note that the binding property and thus the extractability property hold only when the common parameterr is uniformly chosen, while in protocol Com uc the common parameter is dictated by the coin flipping.
However, by the statistically hiding property of Com shext , any unbounded adversary can not guess α better than guessing at random. Therefore for any C * uc the distribution of α⊕β is uniformly chosen over {0, 1} 3nl , and thus the statistically binding property of Com equiv still holds.
Commitment Phase
-Pick a random α ln and executes Com shext as the honest receiver. -Obtain β from C * uc and let r = α ⊕ β.
-Execute protocol Com equiv by running the associated extractor E equiv . If the extractor aborts, abort. Else, let b the output of E equiv . Send (commit, sid, C equiv , R equiv , b ) to F com Lemma 6. For all PPT real-world malicious committer C * uc , for all PPT adversary Z, it holds that:
3. Sim uncOT sets bitĉ to the majority of c i 1 , . . . , c i k (ties are broken arbitrarily).
4. Simulator Sim uncOT queries the ideal functionality with bitĉ and obtains a string s. It chooses a random stringŝ ∈ {0, 1} n and sets sĉ = s and s 1−ĉ =ŝ. Then it runs
Step 5 of the protocol with the pair (s 0 , s 1 ).
We first prove that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the receiver knows only one of st 0 i j and st 1 i j . This already implies that the adversary learns only one of the sender's strings, while the other one remains information-theoretically hidden. However, we must show that the adversary learns the same string in both the real and ideal worlds -it should not be the case that in the real execution, the adversary gets s c , while in the simulation it gets s 1−c . We show that if the cut-and-choose succeeds, then with high probability the simulator extracts the correct bit.
Let Q be the set of queries the adversary makes to PUF sid R . For a query q, we say "Q covers q" if there exists q ∈ Q such that dis(q, q ) < d min . The proof of the following claim appears in [BFSK11] Appendix A, and we sketch it here for completeness.
, with overwhelming probability, Q covers at most one of q 0
Proof. We first show that for a particular q ∈ Q, it can not be the case that both dis(q ,q 0 We call an index i ∈ [2k] "bad" ifb i = Parity(FuzRep(da i , dp i )). Let η be the number of bad indices , i.e., η = |{ i ∈ [2k] | i is bad. }|. We bound the probability that the cut-and-choose succeeds and η ≥ γ, for some parameter γ. This probability is upper bounded by the probability that cut-and-choose succeeds given η ≥ γ. This probability, in turn, can be computed by counting the number of subsets of size k that do not contain any of the γ bad indices. Thus, this probability is: Setting γ = k/10, we get that the probability that the cut-and-choose succeeds and η ≥ k/10 is at most e −k/20 . Now condition on the event that the cut-and-choose succeeds and the number of bad indices is less than k/10. Let the bitĉ extracted by the simulator in Step 3 be 0 (the case whenĉ = 1 is handled analogously). We will argue that in the real execution, s 1 is information theoretically hidden from the receiver. As the number of zeros in the sequence c i 1 , . . . , c i k is more than k/2, and then number of bad indices in [2k] is at most k/10, there must exist an index i j such that (1) c i j = 0 and, (2) i j is not bad. In fact, there will be a large number of such indices. Fix such an index i j . Observe the following:
• Let ρ = Parity(FuzRep(da i j , dp i j )). As i j is not bad, we have that Q covers q ρ i j , and not q 1−ρ i j .
• As c i j = 0, we have b i j = ρ.
In the real execution, the sender prepares the message m 1
is not covered by Q, we have that in the real execution, st 1−ρ i j is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary, which implies that the share s 1 j is hidden, which in turn implies that s 1 is information-theoretically hidden.
D On Unconditional Security with Malicious PUFs
The formal description of the protocol (C uncon , R uncon ) is given in Figure 8 . In the description of the protocol, the (implicit) security parameter will be denoted by n, and we assume that F PUF is parameterized with a PUF family P. Further, the parties also have access to a (m, , t, )-fuzzy extractor (FuzGen, FuzRep) of appropriate matching parameters such that = 3n.
Completeness of protocol (C uncon , R uncon ) follows from response consistency. We focus on hiding and binding properties.
Lemma 7 (Hiding). For any malicious receiver R * uncon , the statistical difference between the ensembles { view R * (C(com, 0), R * (recv))(1 n ) } n∈N and { view R * (C(com, 1), R * (recv))(1 n )) } n∈N is negligible in n.
Proof. Let Q be the set of queries that the receiver R * makes to the committer's PUF sid and let q be the query made by the committer before sending the PUF sid. First consider the case that there exists q ∈ Q such that dis(q , q) < d min . As the receiver is polynomially bounded, the number of queries in Q is a polynomial, say p(n). The total number of queries within a distance d min of queries in Q can be bounded by p(n)n d min (n) , which is a negligible fraction of 2 n . Thus, this event happens with negligible probability. Now consider the case that q / ∈ Q. By the extraction independence property, st is statistically close to the uniform distribution, U . As, for any string r, the distributions U and r ⊕ U are identical, thus it follows from transitivity that the distributions st and st ⊕ r are statistically close.
Committer's Input: Bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Commitment Phase C uncon ⇒ R uncon : Committer sends (init PUF , normal, sid, C uncon ) to F PUF and obtains response (initialized PUF , sid).
Committer uniformly selects a query q ∈ {0, 1} n and sends (eval PUF , sid, C uncon , q) and receives response (response PUF , sid, q, a).
Committer obtains (st, p) ← FuzGen(a), and sends p to R uncon .
Committer sends (handover PUF , sid, C uncon , R uncon ) to F PUF .
C uncon ⇐ R uncon : Receiver receives p from the committer and (handover PUF , sid, C uncon ) from F PUF . It uniformly chooses r ∈ {0, 1} and sends it to the committer. We now turn to the binding property. The proof follows a similar path as in the proof of statistical binding in Naor's commitment [Nao89]. Informally 11 , Naor's argument counts the number of 'bad' strings in the range of the PRG. These are the strings r in the range of a PRG G(·) for which there exist two seeds s 0 , s 1 such that r = G(s 0 ) ⊕ G(s 1 ). For these strings r, equivocation is possible. But because of the expansion property of PRG, the number of bad strings is small. Similarly, in our proof of binding, we use the fact that we have set the parameters of the PUF family and fuzzy extractor such that = 3n. We use the same arguments to define 'bad' strings and show that because of expansion, their number is bounded. Care has to be taken to handle the fact that the output of the PUF is noisy.
Lemma 8 (Binding). For any malicious committer C * uncon , the probability that it wins in the binding game of Definition 6 is negligible in n.
Proof. Recall that we have chosen the parameters of the PUF family and fuzzy extractor such that = 3n. We can think of the adversary choosing the malicious PUF as picking a set of distributions D q 1 , . . . , D q N , where N = 2 n . For a fixed p, call a string st ∈ {0, 1} "heavy" if there exists query q such that Pr [ FuzRep(p, D q ) = st ] ≥ 2 − log 2 ( n ) . Now we will show that the probability of the adversary breaking the binding is negligible. For a fixed first message of the malicious committer, call a string r ∈ {0, 1} 'bad' if the probability that the adversary breaks binding on receiving r in the second step of the protocol is at least 2 −2 log 2 ( n ) . For this to happen, it must be the case that there exist heavy strings st 0 and st 1 such that r = st 0 ⊕ st 1 . Thus, to bound the number of bad strings in {0, 1} , we simply need to bound the number of pairs of heavy strings. By the definition of heavy string, each query can produce at most 2 log 2 ( n ) heavy strings for one PUF. As the total number of queries is 2 n , the total number of pairs of heavy strings is bounded by 2 2(n+ log 2 ( n )) , which is a negligible fraction of 2 3n . E The Brzuska et.al.
[BFSK11] Ideal Functionality F PUF F PUF (rg, d noise , d min , m) receives as initial input a security parameter 1 n and runs with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and adversary S.
• When a party P i writes (init PUF , sid, P i ) on the input tape of F PUF , then F PUF checks whether L already contains a tuple (sid, * , * , * , * ): -If this is the case, then turn into the waiting state.
-Else, draw id ← Sample(1 n ) from the PUF-family. Put (sid, id, P i , * , notrans) in L and write (initialized PUF , sid) on the communication tape of P i .
• When party P i writes (eval PUF , sid, P i , q) on F PUF 's input tape, check if there exists a tuple (sid, id, P i , notrans) in L.
-Else, run a ← Eval(1 n , id, q). Write (response PUF , sid, q, a) on P i 's communication input tape.
• When a party P i sends (handover PUF , sid, P i , P j ) to F PUF , check if there exists a tuple (sid, * , P i , notrans) in L.
-Else, modify the tuple (sid, id, P i , notrans) to the updated tuple (sid, id, ⊥, trans(P j )). Write (invoke PUF , sid, P i , P j ) on S's communication input tape.
• When the adversary sends (eval PUF , sid, S, q) to F PUF , check if L contains a tuple (sid, id, ⊥ , trans( * )).
-Else, run a ← Eval(1 n , id, q) and return (response PUF , sid, q, a) to S.
• When S sends (ready PUF , sid, S) to F PUF , check if L contains the tuple (sid, id, ⊥, trans(P j )).
-Else, change the tuple (sid, id, ⊥, trans(P j )) to (sid, id, P j , notrans) and write (handover PUF , sid, P i ) on P j 's communication input tape and store the tuple (received PUF , sid, P i ).
• When the adversary sends (received PUF , sid, P i ) to F PUF , check if the tuple (received PUF , sid, P i ) exists in L. If not, return to the waiting state. Else, write this tuple to the communication input tape of P i . 
